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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This consolidated class action is brought pursuant to 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1995), and arises out of 
the collapse in 1991 of the Executive Life Insurance Company of 
California.  The plaintiffs, participants in individual account 
pension plans that Unisys Corporation maintained for its 
employees, alleged, inter alia, that the defendants breached 
ERISA's fiduciary duties of prudence and diversification by 
8 
investing plan assets in Executive Life guaranteed investment 
contracts, as well as ERISA's fiduciary duty of disclosure by 
providing participants with misleading or incomplete 
communications regarding these investments and Executive Life's 
financial condition.  In their defense, the defendants raised a 
question of first impression, asserting that section 1104(c) of 
the Act, which relieves fiduciaries of liability for losses which 
result from a plan participant's exercise of control over 
individual account assets, applies.  The plaintiffs appeal the 
district court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. 
 We conclude that there are genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether the defendants breached section 1104(a)'s 
fiduciary duties and as to whether the defendants are entitled to 
section 1104(c)'s protection.  We will, therefore, vacate the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in the defendants' 
favor and will remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings.  
 
I. 
 We begin our analysis by reviewing the evidence of 
record.  In the fall of 1986, Burroughs Corporation and Sperry 
Corporation merged to form Unisys.  Prior to the merger, both 
Sperry and Burroughs had maintained retirement savings plans for 
employees known as the Sperry Retirement Program - Part B (the 
"Sperry Plan") and the Burroughs Employees Savings Thrift Plan 
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(the "BEST Plan"), respectively.  Each plan permitted an employee 
to contribute a percentage of his or her compensation into an 
individual account and to direct that it be invested in any one 
or a number of funds that were comprised of different types of 
investments.  One of the funds in both of these plans invested in 
guaranteed investment contracts ("GICs") issued primarily by 
insurers.  A GIC is a contract under which the issuer is 
obligated to repay the principal deposit at a designated future 
date and to pay interest at a specified rate over the duration of 
the contract. 
 Following the merger, the Sperry Plan and the BEST Plan 
were consolidated to form the Unisys Savings Plan, which took 
effect on April 1, 1988.0  Like its predecessors, the Unisys 
Savings Plan established an individual account for each 
participant and offered several fund alternatives into which a 
                                                           
0
 The parties agree that the Unisys Savings Plan is an 
"individual account plan" within the meaning of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1995).  Section 1002(34) of the Act 
provides: 
 
 § 1002.  Definitions 
 
  (34)  The term "individual account plan" or 
"defined contribution plan" means a pension 
plan which provides for an individual account 
for each participant and for benefits based 
solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant's account, and any income, 
expenses, gains and losses, and any 
forfeitures of accounts of other participants 
which may be allocated to such participant's 
account. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). 
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participant could direct contributions on a tax-deferred basis: 
the Diversified Fund, the Indexed Equity Fund, the Active Equity 
Fund; the Unisys Common Stock Fund; the Short Term Investment 
Fund, and the Insurance Contract Fund.0   
          The Insurance Contract Fund invested in GICs.  The old 
Sperry Plan Fixed Income Fund, a vehicle for GICs, continued to 
exist, but was closed to new contributions.  As GICs matured, 
assets invested in the Fixed Income Fund were reinvested in the 
new Insurance Contract Fund; assets in the BEST Plan equivalent, 
the Guaranteed Investment Contract Fund, were likewise reinvested 
in that Fund, unless a participant specified otherwise.0 
Contributions to the Insurance Contract Fund were allocated on a 
pro rata basis among the various GICs held therein.   
 The Unisys Savings Plan allowed a participant to 
transfer assets from one equity fund to another on a monthly 
basis.  Due to transfer limitation terms that were included in 
the contracts purchased for the GIC Funds, however, asset 
transfers involving those Funds were restricted.  For example, 
all transfers between any of the GIC Funds and the Short-Term 
Investment Fund, another low-risk, interest-earning vehicle, were 
absolutely prohibited.  Moreover, if assets were transferred from 
                                                           
0
 The Plan also accepted "after-tax" and "tax-deductible" 
contributions that had been made under the prior plans as well as 
transfers from other qualified plans or individual retirement 
accounts.  The Plan further provided for matching company 
contributions in the form of shares of Unisys common stock. 
0
 For the sake of convenience, the BEST Plan Guaranteed 
Investment Contract Fund, the Sperry Plan Fixed Income Fund, and 
the Unisys Savings Plan Insurance Contract Fund will be referred 
to collectively as the "GIC Funds". 
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one of the GIC Funds to the equity or Unisys common stock funds, 
a year had to pass before any assets could be transferred to the 
Short-Term Investment Fund; similarly, if assets were transferred 
from the equity or the Unisys common stock funds to the Short-
Term Investment Fund, a year had to transpire before any assets 
could be transferred out of one of the GIC Funds.0  
 Because the Plan was designed to make final 
distribution of a participant's account on retirement, death, 
disability or employment termination, withdrawals of tax-deferred 
contributions prior to those events were limited to circumstances 
of "financial hardship" and were generally taxable as ordinary 
income, plus 10%.    
 In addition to the Unisys Savings Plan, Unisys 
established the Unisys Retirement Investment Plan ("RIP") and the 
Unisys Retirement Investment Plan II ("RIP II") for unionized 
employees, which for all intents and purposes were identical to 
the Unisys Savings Plan.0  Contributions to the Plans designated 
for investment in the Fixed Income Fund or the Insurance Contract 
Fund were invested together. 
                                                           
0
 In addition, the Plan placed a six-month restriction on 
the transfer of assets to the Insurance Contract Fund from the 
equity or Unisys common stock funds if those assets had been 
previously transferred from the Short-Term Investment Fund, as 
well as several other restrictions of six months or a year's 
duration when transfers were made to or from the Best Plan 
Guaranteed Investment Contract Fund or the Sperry Plan Fixed 
Income Fund. 
0
 Again, for the sake of convenience, the Unisys Savings 
Plan, the Unisys Retirement Plan ("RIP") and the Unisys 
Retirement Plan II ("RIP II") will be referred to collectively as 
the "Plans". 
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 Unisys was the Plans' administrator; the Administrative 
Committee, established by the Unisys Board of Directors, carried 
out the Plans' provisions; and the Investment Committee, also 
established by the Board, was responsible for the Plans' 
investments.  The Investment Committee delegated day-to-day 
investment management responsibility for the GIC Funds to two of 
the Investment Committee's members, defendants David White and 
Leon Level, and appointed outside managers to manage investments 
in the Plans' other funds. 
 From time to time White and certain members of his 
staff, including William Heller, Robert Rehley and Charles 
Service, conducted a bid among insurers during which GIC 
contracts were selected for the appropriate GIC Fund.  These 
selections were subject to Level's approval and reported to the 
Investment Committee.  White and his staff did not have written 
guidelines for the bidding process or contract selection; they 
did, however, have informal operating policies and procedures. In 
particular, they developed a rule that no more than 20% of GIC 
Fund assets would be invested with any one issuer. 
 After the merger in 1986, but before the effective date 
of the Plans in April, 1988, two bids for the Fixed Income Fund 
were held.  The first bid occurred on June 9, 1987, in the 
offices of Murray Becker of Johnson & Higgins, a consultant which 
Sperry had used to assist in GIC selections.  Prior to bid day, 
Becker mailed bid specifications on Unisys' behalf to a number of 
insurers, including the Executive Life Insurance Company of 
California, inviting them to make a GIC proposal.  It was Johnson 
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& Higgins' practice to solicit bids only from insurers with a 
superior AAA rating as to claims-paying ability from Standard & 
Poors Corporation.  At the time, Standard & Poors had rated 
Executive Life as a AAA company.  Likewise, A. M. Best Company, 
another rating agency, had assigned Executive Life its highest 
rating of A+.  According to Becker, however, the A+ from A. M. 
Best was of marginal significance since A. M. Best was overly 
generous with its ratings. 
 On the day of the bid, White, his staff and Becker 
reviewed material that Executive Life provided concerning the 
insurer's financial condition and interviewed Executive Life 
representatives about the company's outlook.  The group then 
discussed the Executive Life GIC proposal.  As was his custom, 
Becker noted that the prospect of purchasing Executive Life GICs 
was "controversial" in light of the "junk bonds" Executive Life 
held in its portfolio.  Junk bonds are non-investment securities 
which carry an above-average credit risk and return.  Taking 
their cue from Standard & Poors, which was of the view that the 
risk generated by Executive Life's junk bond investments was 
offset by other conservative aspects of the insurer's investment 
strategy, White and his staff were not deterred from investing in 
Executive Life.  Becker warned, however, that the Standard & 
Poors AAA rating was reliable only as long as Executive Life's 
junk bond holdings did not exceed 35% of its bond portfolio. 
Ultimately, Becker recommended that Unisys consider the purchase 
of a three-year GIC from Executive Life.  While White accepted 
Becker's advice to invest in Executive Life, he rejected Becker's 
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view as to the contract's duration.  In order to acquire the 
highest interest rate that Executive Life offered, 9.45%, White 
purchased a five-year Executive Life GIC for approximately $30 
million.  GIC bids from Travelers Insurance Company and Seattle 
First Bank were also accepted. 
 Subsequent to the June 9, 1987 bid, White and Level 
terminated Johnson & Higgins and did not hire a replacement, 
believing that Unisys personnel could select appropriate GICs 
without the help of a consultant.  A second competitive GIC bid 
for the Fixed Income Fund took place on December 2, 1987. Relying 
heavily on Executive Life's ratings, which had not changed since 
June 9, 1987, White invested just over $135 million into another 
five-year Executive Life GIC paying 9.75% in interest.  Contracts 
were purchased from Seafirst Bank and Travelers Insurance Company 
as well, bearing interest rates of 9.25% and 9.15% respectively. 
 Shortly thereafter, on January 13, 1988, Unisys 
sponsored a GIC bid for the Insurance Contract Fund.  Once again, 
based on the high marks Executive Life continued to receive from 
the rating agencies, White invested about $46 million in a third 
five-year, 9.48% interest-paying Executive Life GIC, bringing the 
total investment in GICs issued by Executive Life to $213 
million. 
 Communications to participants regarding the GIC Funds, 
beginning with BEST Plan and Sperry Plan documents, described the 
Funds as designed to preserve capital and accumulate interest and 
consistently emphasized that investments in GICs were 
"guaranteed" by the issuing insurers.  BEST Plan materials stated 
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that the goal of the Guaranteed Insurance Contract Fund was "to 
preserve the amount invested and to guarantee a rate of return", 
and provided that "[i]n addition to the interest earned, the 
insurance company guarantees the principal of the fund[] . . . 
[and that] your account cannot go down in value; it will always 
be worth as much as you put in plus your share of the interest 
earned under the contract."  Similarly, with respect to the Fixed 
Income Fund, Sperry Plan materials declared that "each year's 
minimum [interest] rate is guaranteed for an entire year."   
 Likewise, the prospectuses for the Plans, distributed 
in the Spring of 1988, stated that the Insurance Contract Fund 
was intended "to preserve capital while earning interest 
income[]" and described the Fund as "invested in contracts with 
insurance companies and other financial institutions which 
guarantee repayment of principal with interest at a fixed or 
fixed minimum rate for specified periods. . . ."  The Unisys 
Savings Plan prospectus noted, however, that "[Unisys] does not 
guarantee the repayment of principal or interest."  Although the 
1988 RIP and RIP II original prospectuses did not include this 
caveat, it was subsequently included in a 1988 supplement to 
each.  Additionally, the Plans' prospectuses pointed out that 
assets of the Insurance Contract Fund were invested in contracts 
issued by, inter alia, Executive Life.   
 The 1988 Summary Plan Descriptions ("SPD"s) for the 
Plans provided that the investment objective of the Insurance 
Contract Fund was to "[p]reserve the amount invested while 
earning interest income[]", described the Funds' investment 
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strategy as "[t]ypically contracts of between 3 and 7 years with 
various insurance companies and other financial institutions 
which guarantee the principal and a specified rate of return for 
the life of each contract", and explained that the future 
performance of any of the funds was not certain: 
[b]enefits available are based on your 
savings plan value at the time of 
distribution.  Your payments from the Plan 
are subject to the performance of the funds 
in which your accounts are invested.  If the 
value declines, you may receive less from the 
Plan than you and the Company contributed. 
 
 With respect to the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 
1995), the 1988 and 1990 prospectuses for the Plans pointed out: 
the Plan is subject to some, but not all, of the provisions of 
the [Act] . . . which [a]mong other things . . . set minimum 
standards of fiduciary responsibility, establish minimum 
standards for participation and vesting, and require that each 
member be furnished with an annual report of financial condition 
and a comprehensive description of the member's rights under the 
Plan. 
 
The Plans' SPDs informed the participants:  
 
you are entitled to certain rights and 
protections under [ERISA] . . . .  In 
addition to creating rights for Plan 
participants, ERISA imposes duties upon the 
people who are responsible for the operation 
of employee benefit plans.  The people who 
operate the [Unisys Savings Plan, the Unisys 
Pension Plan, RIP, and RIP II], called 
`fiduciaries' of the Plans, have a duty to 
[operate] prudently, in your interest and 
that of all members and beneficiaries. 
 
 After the prospectuses and the SPDs were distributed, 
the Investment Committee received correspondence in 1988 and 1989 
from individual participants, including Henry Zylla, the 
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president of one of Unisys' local unions who wrote on behalf of 
the union's members, questioning whether Executive Life GICs 
should have been purchased for the Plans, given the insurer's 
high risk investments.  In responding correspondence, Unisys 
stated that the Committee did not invite "risky" companies to its 
GIC bids, that its GIC selection process continuously emphasized 
"safety" and that all of the contracts it selected for the GIC 
Funds carried investment-grade credit ratings. 
 In January of 1990, some two years after Unisys' last 
Executive Life GIC purchase, Executive Life announced that it had 
written down $515 million in assets due to losses in its bond 
portfolio.  Following this announcement, Executive Life's credit 
ratings were lowered from AAA to A by Standard & Poors; from A+ 
to A by A. M. Best; and from A1 to BAA2 by a third rating 
company, Moody's Investors Service.   
 Concerned that a flood of policy and other contract 
surrenders would cause a liquidity crisis that it would be unable 
to overcome, Executive Life began meeting with its investors to 
discuss its financial condition.  When representatives of 
Executive Life and Unisys met on January 31, 1990, Executive Life 
articulated reasons for asserting that it would continue to meet 
its obligations and survive intact the situation it faced. 
 The next day, Thomas Penhale, an employee in Unisys' 
Human Resources department, sent to defendant Michael Losey, a 
Vice President of Human Resources, a copy of a newspaper article 
on Executive Life with a hand-written note, stating: "[defendant] 
John L[oughlin] got this today.  It is not as `comforting' as 
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Exec[utive] Life led us to believe yesterday." In a memorandum to 
the Investment Committee dated February 2, 1990, however, White, 
who attended the January 31 meeting with Executive Life, 
expressed the view that the insurer "appears to be in reasonably 
good shape to weather the storm." 
 On February 5, 1990, members of the Investment 
Committee and other interested Unisys personnel met to discuss, 
inter alia, the questions Unisys had received from participants 
regarding Executive Life's status and the disclosures the company 
would make to the Plans' participants about the insurer.  After 
some debate, the group decided that Unisys would disseminate 
information to all participants regarding Executive Life's 
condition through an updated prospectus and an accompanying cover 
letter. 
 In late March, 1990, Unisys sent to each participant a 
revised prospectus which stated generally that "an investment in 
any of the investment funds involves some degree of risk[]" and 
that many factors, including the "financial stability of the 
institutions in which assets are invested, the quality of the 
investment portfolios of those institutions, and other economic 
developments will affect . . . the value of a [participant's] 
investment in those funds."  In bold letters, the prospectuses 
added that "[a]s a result, there is no assurance that at any 
point in time the value of an investment in any fund will not be 
lower than the original amount invested."   
 As for the Insurance Contract Fund, the revised 
prospectus stated that its "objective . . . is to preserve 
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capital while earning interest income[]", characterized its 
investments as "contractual obligation[s]" of the issuer, and 
pointed out that the "repayment of principal and interest is 
necessarily subject to the [issuer's] ability to pay . . . [such 
that] a downturn or loss in one or more areas of the [issuer's] 
investment portfolio could have an adverse effect on the 
stability of the [issuer]."  Like the April 1, 1988 prospectus, 
the revised prospectus stated that "[Unisys] does not guarantee 
the repayment of principal or interest[]"; it also informed 
participants that the Investment Committee's guidelines required 
that Unisys purchase GICs from insurers rated "Secure" by 
Standard & Poors, or "Highest Investment Quality" by Moody's 
Invest[ors] Service, or "Superior" or "Excellent" by A. M. Best, 
but that "[c]ontracts issued by an insurance company or other 
institution whose rating is downgraded subsequent to selection 
may continue to be held in the fund."  Finally, Executive Life 
was identified as one of the companies from which GICs had been 
purchased. 
 With the 1990 prospectus, participants received a 
letter from defendant Jack A. Blaine, a Vice President of Human 
Resources, encouraging participants to review the prospectus 
carefully and reminding them that Unisys would not give advice as 
to appropriate investment strategy.  The letter responded to 
questions concerning the "troubled `junk bond' market and the 
effect, if any, that such problems would have on the [GIC Funds]" 
by pointing out that the repayment of principal and interest 
under GICs necessarily and entirely depended on the ability of 
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the insurer to meet its obligations; that Unisys did not 
guarantee the repayment; and that the financial stability of an 
insurer depended on the success of its own portfolio, such that 
an investment in junk bonds could have an adverse effect on 
financial stability.  Lastly, the letter provided that only those 
institutions with a "secure" credit rating at the time of a 
contract bid would be selected for investment.   
 Although a draft of Blaine's letter had made specific 
mention of Executive Life, the letter the participants eventually 
received did not.  The draft's reference to Executive Life's $515 
million asset writedown was removed; a statement disclosing the 
magnitude of the proportion of Fixed Income and Insurance 
Contract Fund investments in Executive Life was crossed out 
because it "could cause panic"; and a statement about informative 
news articles was deleted because it "could cause more concern." 
A comment on the draft stated:  "The overall content and tone do 
[not] sooth[e] any fears and may in fact stir more interest in 
this subject than it deserves." 
 Blaine's letter was accompanied by an enclosure that 
listed all of the GICs held in the GIC Funds at that time, with 
investment value, maturity dates, and the bid day and current 
ratings of the issuing insurer.  The enclosure revealed that 
Executive Life GICs had a combined book value of over $200 
million, maturity dates of June, 1991, June and September, 1992, 
and March, June and August, 1993.  It also showed the recent 
decline in ratings that Executive Life had suffered.  The 1990 
prospectus and the letter from Blaine with the enclosure were the 
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only communications Unisys made to all participants on a 
systematic basis subsequent to Executive Life's January, 1990 
announcement. 
 At about the same time, Unisys distributed to its 
benefits administration personnel a copy of a February 23, 1990 
letter from Fred Carr, Executive Life's Chairman and President, 
which portrayed the company as "healthy", "financially strong", 
and "capable of providing all the benefits promised[]", and 
written responses to specific questions about Executive Life for 
use in addressing concerns that individual participants directed 
their way.  According to Losey's deposition testimony, individual 
participants who asked employees in the Human Resources 
department "[w]ell, gee, how many people ever lost their money in 
this kind of thing[?]" would be told, "I don't remember one time 
they even halfway defaulted."  In March, 1990, Unisys also met 
with union employees and responded to participants' inquiries 
about Executive Life's financial status.    
 Unisys did not, however, disclose two decisions it had 
reached:  one involving its chairman's retirement annuity and the 
second, an Investment Committee resolution.   With respect to 
the first, a few months after sending the revised prospectus to 
participants, Unisys replaced a $500,000 retirement annuity 
issued by Executive Life for Unisys' then Chairman, Michael 
Blumenthal, with an annuity from another insurer at some expense 
to the company.  The second matter occurred at an Investment 
Committee meeting on August 10, 1990, during which was discussed, 
inter alia, the course of action the Plans would take in the 
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event of a Executive Life default.  The Committee ultimately 
resolved "that in the event of a default in any of the guaranteed 
investment contracts . . . distribution to plan participants will 
be reduced by that portion of the participant's account held in 
the defaulted contract."   
 Seeking to reduce the waiting period for asset 
transfers between "non-competing" funds and the GIC Funds from 
twelve months to six, Unisys contacted the issuers from whom GICs 
had been purchased and asked that they agree to appropriate 
contract modifications.  In exchange for Executive Life's consent 
to a waiting period reduction in the contracts it had issued to 
the Plans, Unisys executed a letter agreement on October 17, 1990 
which provided in pertinent part: 
Unisys Corporation hereby further agrees that 
neither it nor its affiliates, employees, 
agents or other representatives will 
communicate with Plan participants regarding 
the financial condition or prospects of 
Executive Life nor issue any other 
communication regarding Executive Life which 
could be reasonably viewed as attempting to 
influence the investment choices of Plan 
participants without first obtaining 
Executive Life's written approval of such 
communication.  In the event such prior 
written approval is not obtained, Executive 
Life may elect to not honor employee requests 
for withdrawals or reallocations provided 
that Executive Life reasonably believes that 
such requests were the direct result of such 
communication. 
 
 During this time, Executive Life's condition was widely 
reported in the financial press.  Eventually, on April 11, 1991, 
the California Commissioner of Insurance seized Executive Life, 
23 
placing it in conservatorship, and on April 12, 1991, issued a 
moratorium on all payments from the insurer.  As a result, Unisys 
isolated and froze the balance in any participant account 
invested in Executive Life by way of the Fixed Income and/or 
Insurance Contract Funds.  At this time, 30% of the Fixed Income 
Fund and 7% of the Insurance Contract Fund were invested with the 
insurer.  On December 6, 1991, the Superior Court of California 
declared Executive Life insolvent. 
 In 1991, several classes composed of Unisys employees 
who participate in one of the Plans and have account balances 
invested in Executive Life and the unions which represent Unisys 
employees commenced twelve separate actions against Unisys, the 
Investment and Administrative Committees of the Unisys Board of 
Directors and individuals who allegedly had served on one or both 
of the Committees. 
 By Pretrial Order dated November 4, 1991, the twelve 
cases were consolidated for all purposes, except trial.  Pursuant 
to this Order, on November 25, 1991, the plaintiffs filed a three 
count second amended consolidated class action complaint against 
the above-named defendants.0  In Count I, all of the plaintiffs 
assert under sections 1045, 1104, 1105, 1109 and 1132 of ERISA, 
that Unisys breached fiduciary duties:  by investing in Executive 
Life GICs; by failing to monitor the investments and divest them 
                                                           
0
 In their briefs, the defendants refer to themselves 
collectively as "Unisys".  We will adopt that designation from 
this point forward. 
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from the Plans;0 by failing to diversify the GIC Funds' assets; 
and by failing to provide adequate disclosures to participants 
regarding "the composition of the portfolios" of the Fixed Income 
and Insurance Contract Funds and the "status of Executive Life's 
financial condition and the effect of [the insurer's] insolvency 
on their investment. . . ."  In Count II, they assert that Unisys 
violated ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements set forth 
in sections 1021(a), 1022(a)(1),(b) and 1023(b) by not furnishing 
an adequate summary plan description and an annual or other 
periodic report which would have apprised the plaintiffs that 
investments in the Fixed Income and Insurance Contract Funds were 
in jeopardy due to Executive Life's financial condition.  In 
Count III, the union plaintiffs claim that Unisys' decision to 
invest in Executive Life and the actions it took when the insurer 
was placed in conservatorship breached certain collective 
bargaining agreements in violation of section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1973 & 
Supp. 1995).     
 In answer to the plaintiffs' ERISA claims, Unisys 
denied the allegations in the second amended complaint and 
asserted by way of a defense that 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c), which 
provides in part that "no person who is otherwise a fiduciary 
shall be liable under [Part 4 -- Fiduciary Responsibility] for 
any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from [a] 
                                                           
0
 It appears from the plaintiffs' briefs that they no 
longer pursue their allegations that Unisys breached fiduciary 
duties by failing to monitor the Executive Life investments and 
divest them from the Plans. 
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participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control [over the 
assets in his account]", relieves it of liability.   
 On July 22, 1994, Unisys filed a motion for summary 
judgment, requesting, inter alia, that judgment be entered in its 
favor as to all counts of the second amended complaint. 
 On January 25, 1995, the district court granted Unisys' 
motion on the plaintiffs' ERISA claims (Counts I and II) and 
denied the motion as to the union plaintiffs' Labor Relations 
Management Act claim (Count III).0  In its opinion, the district 
court began its analysis with what it designated as the 
plaintiffs' ERISA "`Adequate Information' and Control Claim"; 
after setting forth the elements of an adequate summary plan 
description, the court turned immediately to Unisys' section 
1104(c) defense.  Considering whether the Plans' SPDs and 
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 In its motion for summary judgment, Unisys also 
requested that the plaintiffs' jury demand be stricken and argued 
that plaintiffs are not entitled to either punitive damages or 
other extra-contractual remedies under ERISA.  Finding that the 
plaintiffs seek equitable relief under ERISA, the district court 
ruled that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial on 
Counts I and II.  The court retained the union plaintiffs' jury 
trial demand on Count III because it held that the union 
plaintiffs' claim under the Labor Management Relation Act, 1947, 
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1973 & Supp. 1995), raises a legal 
issue.   
 
 The plaintiffs did not appeal the court's decision to 
grant summary judgment on Count II or its decision to strike the 
jury trial demand on Counts I and II.  Likewise, Unisys did not 
appeal the district court's denial of summary judgment or its 
refusal to strike the jury demand as to Count III.   
 
 The court did not address Unisys' contention that ERISA 
does not allow the plaintiffs to recover punitive or other extra-
contractual damages.  The parties have not raised this issue on 
appeal. 
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prospectuses provided "the specific warnings required by ERISA 
and case law to allow the participants to exercise control over 
their investments", the court concluded that Unisys had provided 
the "required information and warnings" by advising participants 
that "`[Unisys] does not guarantee the repayment of principal or 
interest[]'" and "[t]here were no guarantees on their 
investments."  Noting that the Plans were "voluntary" and that 
"consistent with ERISA § 404(c), the plans gave participants the 
option to invest their contributions in one or more of six 
funds[]," with the SPDs stating that "`[y]ou direct how your 
before-tax contributions are invested[]'", the court also 
concluded that the participants had control over their assets.   
 Turning next to the plaintiffs' various claims in Count 
I for breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties, the district court 
disposed of the failure to disclose claim by holding that even 
though "`[t]he duty to disclose material information is the core 
of a fiduciary's responsibility'", a "`significant exception to 
the rules governing fiduciaries applies to plans that permit 
participants to exercise control over individual accounts 
assets.'"   
 With regard to the plaintiffs' assertion that the 
investment in Executive Life GICs was imprudent, the court ruled 
that "Unisys met the requirements of the `experienced prudent 
person[]'" having based its decision to invest in Executive Life 
on appropriate grounds: 
Unisys examined the financial statements of 
Executive Life, all of which indicated that 
it was sound.  It sought the opinion of an 
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expert, who advised that Executive Life was a 
good investment.  Most significantly, Unisys 
relied on the ratings of Standard & Poors and 
Moody's, both of which gave Executive Life 
high ratings of A+ or AAA.  . . .  With all 
of the information available to it at the 
time, Unisys clearly made prudent business 
and investment decisions.  Plaintiffs cannot 
not now use 20/20 hindsight to impose 
liability on Unisys. 
 
The district court did not address the plaintiffs' claim in Count 
I that Unisys failed to satisfy ERISA's duty of diversification. 
        Judgment on Counts I and II of the second amended 
complaint was entered on January 26, 1995, and this consolidated 
appeal by the plaintiffs followed.0 
 
II. 
 In examining the issues raised on appeal, we begin with 
settled principles of procedure involving summary judgment.0 
                                                           
09. Appeals in eleven of the twelve consolidated cases are 
from final judgments as the entry of summary judgment in Unisys' 
favor in those eleven finally resolved all of the claims between 
the parties.  In the twelfth action, where the union plaintiffs 
assert the Labor Management Relations Act claim, the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on only the 
ERISA claims does not dispose of all the claims between the 
parties.  Accordingly, for purposes of appeal, the plaintiffs in 
that action sought the district court's certification pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which was granted.   
 
 Because the twelve cases were not consolidated for 
trial, even though the district court's order granting summary 
judgment to Unisys on Counts I and II of the second amended 
consolidated complaint does not dispose of all of the claims in 
the twelve consolidated actions, it is a final, appealable order 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Hall v. Wilkerson, 926 
F.2d 311, 314 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the dispositive factor 
in determining whether an order disposing of less than all claims 
in a consolidated case is appealable is whether the consolidation 
was for all purposes). 
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Summary judgment should be granted where the record reveals that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists for resolution at trial 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  On summary judgment, the moving party 
need not disprove the opposing party's claim, but does have the 
burden to show the absence of any genuine issues of material 
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 On review of the district court's award of summary 
judgment, we are required to apply the same test the district 
court should have used initially.  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 
(1977).  When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a district 
court's role remains circumscribed in that it is inappropriate 
for a court to resolve factual disputes and to make credibility 
determinations.  Country Floors Inc. v. Partnership Composed of 
Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1991).  Even where 
a case will be heard without a jury, the court on summary 
judgment does not sit as the trier of fact; it only determines 
whether there are issues which must be tried.  Medical Inst. of 
Minnesota v. National Ass'n of Trade and Technical Schools, 817 
F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1987).  To raise a genuine issue of 
material fact the opponent need not match, item for item, each 
piece of evidence proffered by the movant.  Big Apple, BMW, Inc. 
v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993).  In practical 
terms, if the opponent has exceeded the "mere scintilla" 
threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then 
the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against 
the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far 
outweighs that of its opponent.  Id.  It thus remains the 
province of the factfinder to ascertain the believability and 
weight of the evidence.  Id. 
 
 The party opposing the motion is entitled to have his 
allegations taken as true, to receive the benefit of doubt when 
his assertions conflict with those of the movant and to have 
inferences from the underlying facts drawn in his favor.  Big 
Apple, BMW, 974 F.2d at 1362-63.  Ambiguities and conflicts in a 
deponent's testimony are generally matters for the fact-finder to 
sort out.  Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289 
(8th Cir. 1988).  Any "unexplained gaps" in materials submitted 
by the moving party, if pertinent to the material issues of fact, 
justify denial of the motion.  O'Donnell v. United States, 891 
F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989).  
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fact.  Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985).  If the 
movant meets this burden, then the opponent may not rest on 
allegations in pleadings, but must counter with specific facts 
which demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue for trial. 
Id.  Further, even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment 
may not be granted where there is disagreement over inferences 
that can be reasonably drawn from those facts.  As in this case, 
when the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, 
the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the 
nonmoving party has not offered evidence sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to its case.  Id. at 322. 
 With these principles in mind, we turn first to the 
plaintiffs' claim that Unisys committed several breaches of 
ERISA's fiduciary duties.  We turn second to Unisys' assertion 
that the defense set out in section 1104(c) applies in this case. 
 
III. 
 Our analysis commences with the fiduciary 
responsibility provision of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1985 & 
Supp. 1995).  Section 1104(a) imposes several duties upon 
fiduciaries which include the duty of loyalty, the duty to act 
prudently, and the duty to diversify plan investments.  Section 
1104(a) provides in pertinent part: 
§ 1104.  Fiduciary duties 
 
(a) Prudent man standard of care 
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 (1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 
1342, and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary 
shall discharge his duties with respect to a 
plan solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
 (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a 
like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
a like character and with like aims; 
 (C) by diversifying the investments of 
the plan so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses, unless under the circumstances it is 
clearly prudent not to do so[] . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B),(C). 
 When we apply section 1104(a) to the facts of a 
particular case, we remain mindful of ERISA's underlying 
purposes:  to protect and strengthen the rights of employees, to 
enforce strict fiduciary standards, and to encourage the 
development of private retirement plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1001; H.R. 
Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4639-43.  We also bear in mind 
that Congress has instructed that section 1104 "in essence, 
codifies and makes applicable to . . . fiduciaries certain 
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."  S. 
Rep. No. 127, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4838, 4865.   
 
A. 
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 In Count I of the second amended complaint, the 
plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Unisys breached section 
1104(a)(1)(B) by making imprudent investments of plan assets in 
Executive Life.  Unisys contends that, to the contrary, the 
evidence establishes that the purchases of the Executive Life 
GICs were prudent under ERISA as a matter of law, thereby 
entitling it to summary judgment. 
 Under the common law of trusts, a trustee is duty-bound 
"to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent 
[person] would make of his own property having in view the 
preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the 
income to be derived. . . ."  Restatement (Second) of Trusts §227 
(1959).  Further, a trustee is required to use due care, which 
means he must investigate the safety of the investment and its 
potential for income by securing reliable information, and may 
take into consideration the advice of qualified others, as long 
as he exercises his own judgment; to use the skill of a man of at 
least ordinary intelligence; and to use caution, with a view to 
the safety of the principal and to the securing of a reasonable 
and regular income.  Id. cmts. (a) - (c), (e). Whether a trustee 
has acted properly in selecting an investment depends upon the 
circumstances at the time when the investment is made and not 
upon subsequent events.  Thus, if at the time an investment is 
made, it is an investment a prudent person would make, there is 
no liability if the investment later depreciates in value.  Id. 
cmt. o. 
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 Consistent with these common law principles, the courts 
measure section 1104(a)(1)(B)'s "prudence" requirement according 
to an objective standard, focusing on a fiduciary's conduct in 
arriving at an investment decision, not on its results, and 
asking whether a fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to 
investigate and determine the merits of a particular investment. 
Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917-18 (8th Cir. 
1994); Fink v. National Savings and Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-
56 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 
716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 
(1984).  In addition, the prudence requirement is flexible, such 
that the adequacy of a fiduciary's independent investigation and 
ultimate investment selection is evaluated in light of the 
"`character and aims'" of the particular type of plan he serves. 
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).0   
 In this case, our in-depth analysis of the evidence 
convinces us that Unisys has failed to carry its burden on 
summary judgment of showing the absence of any genuine issue of 
                                                           
0
 Similarly, the Department of Labor regulation 
concerning the investment duties of ERISA fiduciaries provides 
that the requirements of section 1104(a)(1)(B) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
§1001 et seq. (1985 and Supp. 1995), are satisfied if fiduciaries 
give "appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances 
that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the 
fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the particular 
investment or investment course of action involved, including the 
role the investment plays in that portion of the plan's 
investment portfolio. . . ."  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(i). 
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material fact as to whether its course of conduct and decision to 
invest in five-year Executive Life GICs in June and December of 
1987 and January of 1988 for the Fixed Income and Insurance 
Contract Funds satisfied ERISA's duty of prudence. 
 We begin with the most basic of ERISA's investment 
fiduciary duties, the duty to conduct an independent 
investigation into the merits of a particular investment.  When 
David White, Unisys' Vice President of Capital Management and 
Trust Investments, was asked at his deposition to describe the 
evaluation he and his staff performed at the time of the June 9, 
1987, bid to satisfy themselves that Executive Life was 
financially sound, he responded that they depended on the 
research that he "believed" Unisys' consultant, Johnson & 
Higgins, had completed: 
Q. Other than the financial information 
provided to you by the companies and the 
ratings of the agencies of which you 
just spoke, did you have any other 
review done of the financial status of 
the insurance companies that were 
bidding? 
 
A. I don't know how to answer that clearly, 
but what was done was we relied on 
Murray's staff, also.  It was conducted 
at his office.  He, in this case -- we 
had never bid Executive Life, you know, 
for the Burroughs plan and it was 
Murray's relationship in effect and he 
had done, I believe, independent 
research.  Otherwise, he would not have 
recommended Executive Life to us.  So we 
had that recommendation. 
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 In his deposition, however, Murray Becker of Johnson & 
Higgins did not confirm that Johnson & Higgins provided research 
to White and his staff:  
Q. Did you have a research staff at Johnson 
& Higgins? 
 
*  *  * 
 
A. Research as to what? 
 
*  *  * 
 
Q. As to the insurance companies? 
 
A. Johnson & Higgins had a committee that I 
was not involved in that approved 
insurance companies that Johnson & 
Higgins was permitted to use.  This was 
general for property casualty and life 
companies across the board. 
 
*   *  * 
 
Q. Were there individuals at the company 
whose responsibility it was to analyze 
the credit worthiness of various 
insurance companies? 
 
*   *   * 
 
A. Johnson & Higgins didn't represent 
itself as a credit-rating agency so it 
did not provide a credit research 
service.  And in my part of Johnson & 
Higgins, we simply adopted a standard of 
recommending companies that were 
recommended -- that a client consider 
companies that had a Triple A rating, 
and not consider companies that didn't 
have a rating, or were rated below 
Triple A. 
 
 While we would encourage fiduciaries to retain the 
services of consultants when they need outside assistance to make 
prudent investments and do not expect fiduciaries to duplicate 
35 
their advisers' investigative efforts, we believe that ERISA's 
duty to investigate requires fiduciaries to review the data a 
consultant gathers, to assess its significance and to supplement 
it where necessary.  In our view, a reasonable factfinder could 
infer from this evidence that Unisys failed to analyze the bases 
underlying Johnson & Higgins' opinion of Executive Life's 
financial condition and to determine for itself whether credible 
data supported Johnson & Higgins' recommendation that Unisys 
consider investing plan assets with the insurer.  A reasonable 
factfinder could also conclude that Unisys passively accepted its 
consultant's positive appraisal of Executive Life without 
conducting the independent investigation that ERISA requires. 
 Likewise, the record calls into question the 
sufficiency of the investigation that White and William Heller 
and Robert Rehley, members of White's staff, conducted prior to 
the Executive Life GIC purchases that were made in December of 
1987 and January of 1988.  Although the services of Johnson & 
Higgins had been terminated and another consultant had not been 
hired, White testified he did "nothing new" by way of research 
into Executive Life's finances between June and December of 1987. 
Heller and Rehley, when deposed, indicated that in connection 
with these purchases, their task was to keep current Unisys files 
on bidding insurers up-to-date.  If, as the record suggests, 
Unisys' investigation consisted of nothing more than confirming 
that Executive Life's credit ratings had not changed since June, 
1987, a reasonable factfinder could find that the investigations 
for the second and final GIC purchase were deficient. 
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 Of course, the thoroughness of a fiduciary's 
investigation is measured not only by the actions it took in 
performing it, but by the facts that an adequate evaluation would 
have uncovered.  Fink, 772 F.2d at 962 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he determination of whether an 
investment was objectively prudent is made on the basis of what 
the trustee knew or should have known; and the latter necessarily 
involves consideration of what facts would have come to his 
attention if he had fully complied with his duty to investigate 
and evaluate." (emphasis in original)).  In this regard, the 
plaintiffs presented evidence which showed that one who 
investigated Executive Life in 1987 and 1988 would have found, 
for example, that Moody's Investors Service had given Executive 
Life a rating which was notably lower than those assigned by 
Standard & Poors and A. M. Best; that the higher ratings that 
Executive Life had received were being questioned in some 
financial circles; that at least one reputable consultant had 
strongly recommended against investments in Executive Life 
annuity contracts; and that Executive Life's reinsurance 
practices were under scrutiny by state regulators.  The record, 
however, does not reveal which of these items Unisys may have 
considered, and raises a question as to what conclusion 
concerning an investment in Executive Life a prudent fiduciary 
would have reached had they come to its attention.   
 Turning to the credit ratings upon which Unisys 
admittedly relied in large measure to make and defend its 
decisions to invest in Executive Life, we observe that here, too, 
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the record raises genuine issues as to whether Unisys' reliance 
was justified and informed.  As noted earlier, Becker advised 
White and his staff that a AAA rating from Standard & Poors was a 
valid indicator of Executive Life's economic vitality only if 
junk bonds did not exceed 35% of its bond portfolio.  When 
deposed, Becker testified that Executive Life's representatives 
had reported in June of 1987 that the insurer met this standard; 
White, who was ultimately responsible for assessing Executive 
Life's prospects, however, was unable at his deposition to recall 
the percentage of the insurer's junk bond holdings at relevant 
times and guessed that the percentage was under "forty or fifty". 
Thus, whether White was, in fact, cognizant of this significant 
item of information when he decided to invest in Executive Life 
is for the factfinder to decide.  Moreover, when Heller was asked 
during his deposition what he knew about the bases underlying 
Standard & Poors ratings, he testified to a limited 
understanding, stating that "[Murray Becker] was the most 
knowledgeable of anyone . . . of the methodology of Standard & 
Poors.  We would not have been knowledgeable in that area." 
Whether the rating was a reliable measure of Executive Life's 
financial status under the circumstances and whether Unisys was 
capable of using the rating effectively are, therefore, matters 
which must be decided at trial.  See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 
F.2d at 1474 ("An independent appraisal is not a magic wand that 
fiduciaries may simply waive over a transaction to ensure that 
their responsibilities are fulfilled.  It is a tool and like all 
tools, is useful only if used properly.").  
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 When we focus on the five-year duration and interest 
terms of the Executive Life GICs, we find additional issues for 
trial.  The record is uncontroverted that, in June of 1987, 
Becker advised in favor of the purchase of an Executive Life GIC 
of only three-years duration and that White did not heed his 
advice as to the contract's duration; the record does not 
resolve, however, whether the relative merits of these different 
maturity dates, which could have had a significant impact on the 
risk associated with the investment, were debated and to what 
result.  Rehley recalled some discussion on the issue; Heller did 
not believe that such a discussion took place; and Becker could 
not remember whether any consideration, one way or the other, was 
given to the matter.  We believe that if this debate did not take 
place, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Unisys did not 
adequately deliberate its investment decision and that had it 
done so, it would have rejected a long-term investment in 
Executive Life.  Moreover, that White sought to maximize interest 
rates by investing in the five-year GICs is not disputed; whether 
he inappropriately sacrificed security in making investments for 
Funds where the preservation of capital was of paramount concern 
is yet another issue for trial.  The dramatic disparity between 
the interest rates that Executive Life offered and those offered 
by other successful bidders could lead a factfinder to infer that 
the risk accompanying Executive Life's yields was unacceptably 
high.  
 The record also raises a question as to whether Unisys 
was equipped to conduct GIC bids unassisted and whether the 
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absence of written guidelines for the bidding process impeded its 
ability to make prudent investment decisions.  As noted, when 
questioned about credit ratings, Heller testified that he and his 
colleagues lacked a certain expertise, and when questioned about 
the "negative consequence" of the absence of written guidelines, 
he testified:  "[T]here was the possibility that we would be 
placing money with companies that would subsequently run into 
trouble.  There was also the fear that too much money could be 
with any one issuer."   
 Finally, we note a report prepared by George M. 
Gottheimer, Jr., an expert retained by the plaintiffs, opining 
that the purchases of long-term Executive Life GICs in 1987 and 
1988 were imprudent.0  According to Mr. Gottheimer, Unisys 
breached its fiduciary duties by not adequately investigating the 
financial condition of Executive Life, by not having guidelines 
against which to measure the insurer; by relying solely on the 
credit ratings Executive Life had received; by placing almost 
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 Unisys argues that we may not consider Mr. Gottheimer's 
report because it was not in the form of a sworn affidavit as 
required by the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).  Unisys, however, did not 
move to strike nor did it otherwise object to Dr. Gottheimer's 
report in the district court.  Indeed, Unisys placed the report 
in the record. 
   
 We agree with the plaintiffs and our sister courts of 
appeals that Rule 56 defects are waived where they are not raised 
in the district court.  See, e.g., Humane Soc. of The United 
States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 96 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Rule 56 
defects are waived where motions to strike are not filed); 
DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 821 F.2d 111, 114 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987) (citing "unanimous 
accord" on the question in five other courts of appeals).  We 
think this rule is especially applicable given that it was Unisys 
which submitted the report to the district court.   
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exclusive emphasis on yield; and by not employing the services of 
a consultant for all of the purchases in view of its lack of 
knowledge and skill.  Mr. Gottheimer's opinion, based on his 
interpretation of the deposition testimony and exhibits he 
reviewed, is itself some evidence of Unisys' imprudence, capable 
of defeating Unisys' motion for summary judgment. 
 We thus conclude that in response to Unisys' motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiffs raised genuine issues of 
material fact to support their claim that the investment of plan 
assets in Executive Life GICs violated section 1104(a)(1)(B)'s 
duty of prudence.  
  
 B. 
 We turn next to the plaintiffs' claim in Count I that 
Unisys violated ERISA's fiduciary duty set forth in 29 U.S.C. 
§1104(a)(1)(C), to "diversify[] the investments in the plan so as 
to minimize the risk of large losses", by placing an excessive 
amount of plan assets in Executive Life GICs.   
 As a general proposition, ERISA's duty to diversify 
prohibits a fiduciary from investing disproportionately in a 
particular investment or enterprise.  A Congressional Committee 
report on the Act's diversification provision provides: 
A fiduciary usually should not invest the 
whole or an unreasonably large proportion of 
the trust property in a single security. 
Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest 
the whole or an unduly large proportion of 
the trust property in one type of security or 
in various types of securities dependent upon 
the success of one enterprise or upon 
41 
conditions in one locality since the effect 
is to increase the risk of large losses.  
  
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5038, 5085.0 
 ERISA's duty to diversify is not measured by hard and 
fast rules or formulas.  Congress has instructed that "[t]he 
degree of investment concentration that would violate this 
requirement to diversify cannot be stated as a true percentage, 
because a prudent fiduciary must consider the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  The factors to be considered include 
(1) the purposes of the plan; (2) the amount of the plan assets; 
(3) financial and industrial conditions; (4) the type of 
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 Section 1104(a)(1)(C) of ERISA in large part reflects 
the fiduciary duty set forth in the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts: 
 
 §228.  Distribution of Risk of Loss 
 
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of 
the trust, the trustee is under a duty to 
distribute the risk of loss by reasonable 
diversification of investments, unless under 
the circumstances it is prudent not to do so. 
 
*   *   * 
Comment: 
 a.  Duty to diversity investments.  The 
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to 
exercise prudence in diversifying the 
investments so as to minimize the risk of 
large losses, and therefore he should not 
invest a disproportionately large part of the 
trust estate in a particular security or type 
of security.  It is not enough that each of 
the investments is a proper investment. . . . 
 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 228, cmt. a (1959). 
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investment, whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or 
otherwise; (5) distribution as to geographic location; (6) 
distribution as to industries; (7) the dates of maturity."  Id. 
at 5085.  Further, the Act's legislative history informs that a 
plan may invest wholly in insurance or annuity contracts, since 
generally an insurance company's assets are to be invested in a 
diversified manner.  Id.  Finally, if a plaintiff proves a 
failure to diversify, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
demonstrate that nondiversification was nonetheless prudent.  Id. 
at 5084. 
 Before we consider the substance of the plaintiffs' 
failure to diversify charge and whether summary judgment was 
properly entered in Unisys' favor, we must determine how the duty 
set forth in section 1104(a)(1)(C) is measured in the context of 
the kind of Plans before us, which are comprised of a number of 
discrete funds, each with its own distinct type of investment. 
Not surprisingly, the parties maintain diametrically-opposed 
positions on the issue:  Unisys argues that we must measure 
diversification by considering all of the investments the Plans 
hold, and the plaintiffs urge evaluation of diversification by 
considering the investments solely in the Fixed Income and 
Insurance Contract Funds.   
 Looking first to ERISA's language, we find little 
guidance; the Act refers only to a fiduciary's duty to diversify 
the "plan's" investments.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).  ERISA's 
legislative history, however, indicates that a fiduciary's 
performance of the duty may be measured by the diversity it has 
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achieved in a particular investment vehicle and, where the 
management of a plan's investments is distributed among several 
managers, in the segment of the plan for which it has 
responsibility.  Congress stated: 
[A]lthough the fiduciary may be authorized to 
invest in industrial stocks, he should not 
invest a disproportionate amount of the plan 
assets in the shares of corporations engaged 
in a particular industry.  If he is investing 
in mortgages on real property he should not 
invest a disproportionate amount of the trust 
in mortgages in a particular district or on a 
particular class of property so that a 
decline in property values in that district 
or of that class might cause a large loss.  
 
An investment manager, A, is responsible for 
10% of the assets of a plan and is instructed 
by the named fiduciary or trustee to invest 
solely in bonds; another investment manager, 
B, is responsible for a different 10% of the 
assets of the same plan and instructed to 
invest solely in equities.  . . . In these 
circumstances, A would invest solely in bonds 
in accordance with his instructions and would 
diversify the bond investments in accordance 
with the diversification standard, the 
prudent man standard, and all other 
provisions applicable to A as a fiduciary. 
Similarly, B would invest solely in equities 
in accordance with his instructions and these 
standards.   
 
H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 5084. 
 In addition to Congress' direction, we believe the case 
of GIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 
895 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1990), is instructive.  There the 
plaintiff maintained a profit sharing plan for its employees 
which consisted of three funds.  Plan participants allocated 
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their respective account balances among the funds and were 
permitted to change their investment election or to withdraw from 
the plan once a year.  The plaintiff hired the defendant to 
manage the investments of Fund A, an asset allocation account 
which was invested in fixed income securities, equities of 
publicly traded companies and money market instruments.  The 
defendant adopted a strategy to invest Fund A assets in primarily 
long-term government bonds, which were highly liquid and carried 
a minimal credit risk.  Due to a series of required cash 
disbursements, however, the defendant was required to sell Fund A 
assets at a loss.  The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that, inter 
alia, the defendant breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA to 
diversify the Fund's investments.  
 On appeal from the judgment entered against it, the 
defendant argued that its obligation to diversify was properly 
measured by considering the investments of the entire plan, not 
merely the investments in Fund A.  The court of appeals disagreed 
and affirmed the judgment, reasoning:  
It is undisputed, though, that [the 
defendant] exercised no control over any fund 
other than Fund A.  Moreover, Fund A could 
not draw upon the other funds for the purpose 
of cash pay-outs.  Even if the entire plan 
were to be considered in determining whether 
the diversification requirement has been met, 
[the defendant] made no investigation of the 
other funds, either.  Mr. Burton, whose 
testimony the district court credited, 
declared that the existence of Fund D did not 
influence how [the defendant] invested the 
assets of Fund A. 
 
Id. at 733. 
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 Although the facts in this case and GIW Industries 
differ in certain respects,0 we find the approach taken by the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applicable, persuasive, 
and in keeping with Congress' intent in section 1104(a)(1)(C). 
Here, as there, Unisys was responsible for investing a portion of 
the Plans' assets in designated investments.  Similarly, the 
investments that other managers made for the Plans in other 
investment areas had no bearing on the investment choices Unisys 
made for the Funds it managed.  Moreover, plan-wide investments 
were not available (and it would appear could not be available) 
to offset losses sustained by the Fixed Income and Insurance 
Contract Funds as a result of Executive Life's failure.  Thus, 
the risk of loss which section 1104(a)(1)(C) aims to minimize was 
not distributed among the Plans' total holdings; it was, instead, 
spread only among the GIC Funds' contracts.  We, therefore, 
conclude that under these circumstances, Unisys' satisfaction of 
the duty to diversify is properly assessed by examining the 
concentration of Executive Life investments in the Fixed Income 
and Insurance Contract Funds.   
 Because the record is incomplete in critical respects, 
however, we cannot determine whether Unisys is entitled to 
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 We note that the fund at issue in GIW Indus., Inc. v. 
Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 
1990), in contrast to the GIC Funds here, was, by definition, to 
include a variety of investment types -- fixed income securities, 
equities of publicly traded companies and money market 
instruments.  Id. at 730.  Thus, it would seem that the 
defendant's investment strategy -- to invest primarily in long-
term bonds -- violated the funds inherent diversification 
requirement.  In our view, this fact difference is not 
significant to our analysis. 
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summary judgment on this aspect of the plaintiffs' case.  For 
example, as the record does not reveal the rationale for Unisys' 
rule not to place more than 20% of GIC Fund assets with a single 
issuer, the process by which Unisys may have applied the rule to 
the GIC purchases at issue, or the analysis that Unisys may have 
undertaken of the factors Congress has directed prudent 
fiduciaries to consider, we cannot decide whether reasonable 
minds could differ as to the adequacy of Unisys' actions with 
regard to diversification.  We are also left to ponder how Unisys 
attempted to maintain a steady degree of diversification where 
due to the reinvestment of proceeds from the Fixed Income into 
the Insurance Contract Fund, the percentage of assets in 
Executive Life contracts in each Fund changed over time or why, 
as White testified, Unisys assessed diversification according to 
the Funds' aggregate exposure to Executive Life, and not 
according to the exposure in each Fund.0  Moreover, assuming that 
the concentration of assets placed with Executive Life in the 
Fixed Income or the Insurance Contract Fund was excessive, the 
record does not reveal whether, as section 1104(a)(1)(C) permits, 
there may have been special circumstances excusing Unisys from 
diversifying GICs.  Finally, by its terms, ERISA requires a 
fiduciary to diversify so as to avoid "large losses". Because the 
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 In December of 1988, the record shows that 21.7% of the 
Fixed Income Fund and 19.18% of the Insurance Contract Fund were 
invested in Executive Life; as of March 31, 1991, shortly before 
the plaintiffs' account balances were frozen, 30% of the Fixed 
Income Fund and 7% of the Insurance Contract Fund were invested 
in the insurer, with exposure on an aggregate basis at about 15%. 
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amount of losses the Fixed Income and Insurance Contract Funds 
will ultimately suffer has remained uncertain, the district court 
stayed discovery on the issue of damages; the summary judgment 
materials submitted to the district court by the parties were, by 
order, limited to liability issues.  We further understand that 
discovery on damages issues proceeded after Unisys' summary 
judgment motion was filed.  Obviously, whether "large losses" 
were avoided and in turn, whether Unisys satisfied its burden on 
summary judgment as to the duty to diversify, cannot be 
determined on the record before us.  
 We, therefore, conclude that Unisys' request for 
summary judgment in its favor on the plaintiffs' section 
1104(a)(1)(C) failure to diversify claim was premature.  Upon 
remand, the record may be developed and a motion for summary 
judgment may be judged on the basis of the principles we have set 
forth. 
 
C. 
 We now turn our attention to the plaintiffs' claim in 
Count I that Unisys breached section 1104(a)'s fiduciary duty to 
disclose.  As we understand it, the plaintiffs' claim is that 
Unisys misrepresented the risks associated with investing monies 
in the Fixed Income and Insurance Contract Funds through 
misleading or incomplete communications regarding the Funds' 
portfolio once the Executive Life GICs had been purchased, as 
well as Executive Life's financial condition in 1990.  In view of 
the district court's ruling that Unisys' disclosure obligations 
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are defined solely by section 1104(c), the threshold issue we 
must consider is whether the plaintiffs' claim under section 
1104(a) may continue. 
 Looking for guidance to our cases regarding ERISA's 
fiduciary duty to inform, we note that we have repeatedly held 
that a fiduciary may not materially mislead those to whom section 
1104(a)'s duties of loyalty and prudence are owed.  In re Unisys 
Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255, 
1261 (3d Cir. 1995); Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
33 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 1994); Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania 
Teamsters Health and Welfare Plan, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 
1994); Fisher v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993).  Thus, 
in Fisher, where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
misrepresented its intention to establish a "retirement 
sweetener", we held that under section 1104(a) "[a] plan 
administrator may not make affirmative material 
misrepresentations to plan participants when asked about changes 
to an employee pension benefits plan.  Put simply, when a plan 
administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully."  994 F.2d at 
135.  We also concluded that a misrepresentation was "material" 
if there was a "substantial likelihood that it would mislead a 
reasonable employee in making an adequately informed decision 
about if and when to retire."  Id.  Because the content of the 
communications at issue and whether such communications 
constituted affirmative, material misrepresentations were 
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questions of fact, we reversed the summary judgment that had been 
entered for the defendant and remanded the case for trial.  Id.  
 Shortly thereafter, in Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania 
Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994), 
where the plaintiff claimed that her deceased husband's employer 
had engaged in repeated misrepresentations that prevented her 
from electing to continue medical coverage under COBRA, we 
considered "to what extent a fiduciary's alleged misinformation 
or failure to provide relevant information constitutes a breach 
of fiduciary duty under § [11]04(a)."  Id. at 1300.  Guided by, 
inter alia, section 173 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,0 
we concluded that "[the] duty to inform is a constant thread in 
the relationship between beneficiary and trustee; it entails not 
only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative 
duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be 
harmful."  Id.  We acknowledged that "the duty recognizes the 
disparity of training and knowledge that potentially exists 
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 Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts: 
 
d.  Duty in the absence of a request by 
the beneficiary.  Even if the trustee is 
not dealing with the beneficiary or the 
trustee's own account, he is under a 
duty to communicate to the beneficiary 
material facts affecting the interest of 
the beneficiary which he knows the 
beneficiary does not know and which the 
beneficiary needs to know for his 
protection in dealing with a third 
person. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173, cmt. d, cited in, Bixler v. 
Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 
1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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between a lay beneficiary and a trained fiduciary[]", and we 
further concluded that "the fiduciary's obligations will not be 
excused merely because [the beneficiary] failed to comprehend or 
ask about a technical aspect of the plan."  Id.  Finding evidence 
from which a trier of fact could have inferred that the employer 
knew that the plaintiff was left with substantial unpaid medical 
expenses and that she could have received reimbursement for those 
expenses under the employer's plan by signing and returning the 
COBRA notice her husband received, we viewed the employer's 
failure to advise the plaintiff of COBRA coverage as a potential 
breach of fiduciary duty.  This was so even though the plaintiff 
contacted the employer while the COBRA election period was open 
and inquired only about the availability of death benefits.  Id. 
at 1302.  Thus, we held:  "[I]f indeed [the employer] was acting 
in a fiduciary capacity, it acted under a duty to convey complete 
and accurate information that was material to [the plaintiff's] 
circumstance.  Her circumstance was clearly broader than her 
inquiry".  Id. at 1302-03.  Reversing the grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant and remanding, we instructed the 
district court to determine whether "`material information' may 
have included more than the mere fact that the [employer] did not 
offer life insurance . . . ."  Id. at 1303. 
 Most recently, In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical 
Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
reaffirmed that an ERISA fiduciary has a duty under section 
1104(a) to convey complete and accurate information when it 
speaks to participants and beneficiaries regarding plan benefits. 
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There retired employees were informed by summary plan 
descriptions and company representatives that they had lifetime 
medical benefits.  Nonetheless, relying on a reservation of 
rights clause in the plans that gave it the right to terminate 
"at any time" or for "any reason", the company announced its 
decision to terminate all existing medical benefits plans and 
replace them with a new plan that altered post-retirement medical 
benefits in substantial measure.  The retirees filed a class 
action against the company, asserting, inter alia, that the 
company breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA by affirmatively 
misleading plan participants about the duration of their retiree 
medical benefits.  Noting that our prior decisions "firmly 
establish that when a plan administrator affirmatively 
misrepresents the terms of a plan or fails to provide information 
when it knows that its failure to do so might cause harm, the 
plan administrator has breached its fiduciary duty to individual 
plan participants and beneficiaries", id. at 1264, we upheld the 
district court's decision to permit the plaintiffs' breach of 
fiduciary duty claim to proceed where the evidence established 
"that the [defendant] company actively misinformed its employees 
by affirmatively representing to them that their medical benefits 
were guaranteed once they retired, when in fact the company knew 
this was not true and that employees were making important 
retirement decisions relying upon this information . . . ."  Id. 
at 1266-67.0 
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 In In Re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" 
Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995), we also reaffirmed our 
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 Contrary to the district court's ruling, we believe 
these principles may apply in the instant case, even if the Plans 
fall within the purview of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c).  By its terms, 
section 1104(c) relieves fiduciaries of liability for breaches of 
fiduciary duty which result from a participant's or a 
beneficiary's exercise of control; it does not define nor does it 
relieve fiduciaries of section 1104(a)'s duties in the first 
instance.  Therefore, the question we face at this juncture is 
not whether section 1104(c), even assuming it applies, exempts 
Unisys from section 1104(a)'s disclosure duty; it is whether the 
duty as we have defined it extends to the circumstances presented 
in this case.  Although our prior decisions concerned allegations 
of material misrepresentations relating to the terms of a plan or 
the benefits to which participants or beneficiaries were 
entitled, we hold that their underlying rationale applies with 
the same force here.  We can discern no reason why our 
admonitions that "when a [fiduciary] speaks, it must speak 
truthfully[]", Fisher, 994 F.2d at 135, and when it communicates 
with plan participants and beneficiaries it must "convey complete 
and accurate information that [is] material to [their] 
circumstance[]", Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1302-03, should not apply to 
alleged material misrepresentations made by fiduciaries to 
participants regarding the risks attendant to a fund investment, 
where, as here, the participants were charged with directing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conclusion in Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1298, that under section 
1132(a)(3) of ERISA, equitable relief is available to an 
individual harmed by a breach of fiduciary duty.  57 F.3d at 
1266-69.  The issue of relief is not raised in this appeal. 
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investment of their contributions among the Plans' various funds 
and the benefits they were ultimately provided depended on the 
performance of their investment choices.  We also hold that in 
this context, a misrepresentation is "material" if there was a 
substantial likelihood that it would have misled a reasonable 
participant in making an adequately informed decision about 
whether to place or maintain monies in the Fixed Income and/or 
Insurance Contract Funds.  See Fisher, 994 F.2d at 135.  
 It is important to note what we have not decided.  As 
the uncontroverted record reveals that Unisys elected and indeed 
intended to communicate with participants about the risks 
accompanying investments in the Fixed Income and Insurance 
Contract Funds and Executive Life's financial condition in 1990,0 
we have not determined whether Unisys had a duty under section 
1104(a) to communicate anything at all to the Plans' participants 
about these matters in the first place.  We also note that we do 
not view the plaintiffs as claiming, nor do we hold, that Unisys 
was obligated to give investment advice, to opine on Executive 
Life's financial condition or to predict Executive Life's 
eventual demise.  See id. at 135 (citations omitted) ("[W]e 
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 Unisys does not dispute that it made disclosures to 
participants, and describes the information it disseminated as 
intended to disclose the "nature of the [Plan's Executive Life 
holdings] and the attendant risks" and the "developments 
surrounding Executive Life . . . ."  (See Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Jury 
Demand, pp. 17, 24).  As in the district court, on appeal Unisys 
discusses the adequacy of its disclosures only in terms of 
section 1104(c). 
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hasten to add that ERISA does not impose a `duty of clairvoyance' 
on fiduciaries."). 
 Turning our attention to the record, we find a number 
of triable issues.  Clearly there is evidence of several 
communications made by Unisys to plan participants on an 
individual, group or systematic basis regarding the nature of and 
risks associated with investments in the Fixed Income and 
Insurance Contract Funds and Executive Life's downturn.0 Whether 
the communications constituted misrepresentations and whether 
they were material under the principles we have articulated are 
questions of fact that are properly left for trial.  Id. at 135.  
See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 236 (holding that misleading summary plan 
description coupled with misrepresentations in an audiotape and a 
pamphlet supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty).  At 
this point, we observe that what was stated, as well as what was 
left unstated, by Unisys in its communications to plan 
participants is relevant. In our view, while Unisys was not 
obligated to share with participants everything it knew about 
GICs and Executive Life, it was obligated to impart to 
participants material information of which it had knowledge that 
was sufficient to apprise the average plan participant of the 
risks associated with investing in the Fixed Income and Insurance 
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 For the first time on appeal Unisys asserts that the 
plaintiffs "have submitted no cognizable proof of detrimental 
reliance."  Because Unisys did not proffer this issue in the 
district court, we decline to address it.  See Selected Risks 
Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983) (federal 
appellate court generally does not consider issues not raised in 
the district court). 
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Contract Funds in view of the purchases of the Executive Life 
GICs and the financial condition Executive Life presented in 
1990.  Moreover, in this regard, we do not, as Unisys urges, 
distinguish between "public" and "non-public" information nor do 
we limit Unisys' duty to disclose to the latter.  We do not see 
any reason under the circumstances for doing so, and at any rate, 
Unisys included public data, (credit ratings, for example), in 
its communications to plan participants. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs raise 
genuine issues of material facts on their section 1104(a) failure 
to disclose claim. 
 
IV. 
 Lastly, we address Unisys' assertion that section 
1104(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1995), applies 
in this case. 
 Generally speaking, ERISA holds fiduciaries who commit 
breaches of duty liable for resulting losses.  29 U.S.C. §1109.0  
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 Section 1109 of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 
1995), states in pertinent part: 
 
§ 1109.  Liability for breach of fiduciary duty 
 
 (a) Any person who is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties 
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter 
shall be personally liable to make good to 
such plan any losses to the plan resulting 
from each such breach. . . . 
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Under section 1104(c) of the Act, however, a fiduciary is not 
liable for any loss or breach which results from a participant's 
exercise of control over the assets in his or her individual 
account.  Moreover, a participant who exercises such control is 
not deemed a fiduciary.  Section 1104(c) states:  
      § 1104.  Fiduciary Breaches 
(c) Control over assets by participant or beneficiary 
 
 In the case of a pension plan which 
provides for individual accounts and permits 
a participant or beneficiary to exercise 
control over the assets in his account, if a 
participant or beneficiary exercises control 
over the assets in his account (as determined 
under regulations of the Secretary0)-- 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
0
     Recognizing that "there may be difficulties in determining 
whether the participant in fact exercises control over his 
account[,]" Congress directed that "whether participants and 
beneficiaries exercise independent control is to be determined 
pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor."  
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5038, 5086.  
 
          The Secretary of Labor issued a final regulation for 29 
U.S.C. §1104(c) in October, 1992.  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1.  The 
regulation sets forth in considerable detail the "kinds of plans 
that are 'ERISA section [1104(c)] plans,' the circumstances in 
which a participant or beneficiary is considered to have 
exercised independent control over the assets in his account as 
contemplated by section [1104(c)], and the consequences of a 
participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control."  Id. 
§2550.404c-1(a).   
 
          Briefly, under the regulation, a plan must inform 
participants or beneficiaries that the plan is intended to 
constitute a plan described in section 1104(c) of ERISA and Title 
29 of the Code of Federal Regulations and that "the fiduciaries 
of the plan may be relieved of liability for any losses which are 
the direct and necessary result of investment instructions given 
by such participant or beneficiary."  Id. § 2550.404c-
1(b)(2)(1)(i).  The plan must also allow participants the 
opportunity to choose from a broad range of investment 
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   (1) such participant or 
beneficiary shall not be deemed to 
be a fiduciary by reason of such 
exercise, and 
 
   (2) no person who is 
otherwise a fiduciary shall be 
liable under this part for any 
loss, or by reason of any breach, 
which results from such 
participant's or beneficiary's 
exercise of control. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (footnote added). 
 Finding that the Plans gave the plaintiffs the 
authority to determine into which Funds their respective 
contributions were directed and that Unisys advised them of the 
"non-guaranteed" nature of the investments in the Fixed Income 
and Insurance Contract Funds, the district court held that the 
plaintiffs had "control" over their assets under section 1104(c) 
and that, therefore, Unisys was freed from section 1104(a)'s 
disclosure duties.  Because the court concluded that Unisys was 
entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, it did not reach Unisys' assertion that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
alternatives, give investment instruction with appropriate 
frequency, diversify investments, and obtain sufficient 
information to make informed investment decisions.  Id. 
§2250.404c-1(a)-(c). 
 
          Generally, the regulation "is effective with respect to 
transactions occurring on or after the first day of the second 
plan year beginning on or after October 13, 1992." Id. 
§2250.404c-1(g)(1).  Transactions occurring before this date are 
governed by section 1104(c) of the Act without regard to the 
regulation.  Id. § 2250.404c-1(g)(3).  
 
          As the regulation was not in effect when the 
transactions at issue occurred, it does not apply or guide our 
analysis in this case. 
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section 1104(c) applies to relieve it of liability for the 
plaintiffs' alleged losses.  We have already determined that the 
court erred in granting summary judgment to Unisys on the 
plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims and in using section 
1104(c) to excuse Unisys from the duty to inform that ERISA 
imposes upon fiduciaries.  We must now determine whether the 
district court's decision to grant Unisys summary judgment should 
nonetheless be affirmed because Unisys urges that section 1104(c) 
provides it with a complete defense to the plaintiffs' claims.    
          Our task in interpreting section 1104(c) and applying 
it here is, of course, to effectuate Congress' intent.  Negonsott 
v. Samuels, ___U.S.___, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 1122-23 (1993).  As with 
any inquiry of statutory construction, we start with the text of 
the statute, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consolidated 
Indus., Inc., 998 F. 2d 1192, 1198 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 687 (1994); "where [Congress'] will has 
been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."  Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982).  If the statutory 
language is unclear, we then look to the Act's legislative 
history. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).   
          It is Unisys' position that even if it failed to 
satisfy ERISA's duties of prudence and diversification in the 
first instance by purchasing the Executive Life GICs for the 
Plans, the losses allegedly sustained in this case resulted from 
the "control" each plaintiff as a plan participant exercised --
the decision to invest in Executive Life by making an informed 
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choice to contribute to and maintain assets in the Fixed Income 
and Insurance Contract Funds.  The plaintiffs' control, according 
to Unisys, emanated from two sources:  the information Unisys 
distributed to plan participants regarding the personal 
responsibility they assumed for investment decisions, the nature 
of investments in the Fixed Income and Insurance Contract Funds 
in general and the Funds' holdings in Executive Life in 
particular,0 as well as the Plans' contribution and transfer 
terms, which allowed each participant the freedom to allocate his 
or her assets among the various investment funds as he or she saw 
fit. 
 Given Unisys' position, the first question we must 
answer regarding section 1104(c) is whether the statute allows a 
fiduciary, who is shown to have committed a breach of duty in 
making an investment decision, to argue that despite the breach, 
it may not be held liable because the alleged loss resulted from 
a participant's exercise of control.  In light of section 
1104(c)'s plain language, we believe that it does.  There is 
                                                           
0
 The information which Unisys contends is a source of 
the plaintiffs' control includes representations that the 
plaintiffs allege were materially misleading in violation of 
section 1104(a)'s fiduciary duty to disclose.  Obviously, given 
the role these representations play in Unisys' section 1104(c) 
defense, Unisys cannot claim that section 1104(c) would relieve 
it from liability in the event that the representations are found 
to constitute breaches of ERISA's disclosure duties.  It is also 
obvious that in the event these representations are found to have 
materially misled the plaintiffs, Unisys' theory of control under 
section 1104(c) would fail.  Indeed, the parties do not dispute 
that accurate and complete information regarding the investments 
Unisys made for Fixed Income and Insurance Contract Funds is 
essential to the section 1104(c) control Unisys contends the 
plaintiffs exercised in this case. 
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nothing in section 1104(c) which suggests that a breach on the 
part of a fiduciary bars it from asserting section 1104(c)'s 
application.  On the contrary, the statute's unqualified 
instruction that a fiduciary is excused from liability for "any 
loss" which "results from [a] participant's or [a] beneficiary's 
exercise of control"0 clearly indicates that a fiduciary may call 
upon section 1104(c)'s protection where a causal nexus between a 
participant's or a beneficiary's exercise of control and the 
claimed loss is demonstrated.  This requisite causal connection 
is, in our view, established with proof that a participant's or a 
beneficiary's control was a cause-in-fact, as well as a 
substantial contributing factor in bringing about the loss 
incurred.  See Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 
953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Section [1109] of ERISA 
establishes that an action exists to recover losses that 
`resulted' from the breach of fiduciary duty; thus the statute 
does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the 
proximate cause of the losses claimed . . . ."); Brandt v. 
Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1982) (Under 29 U.S.C. 
§1109, where "a fiduciary . . . who . . . breaches . . . shall be 
personally liable to make good . . . any losses resulting from 
each such breach", a causal connection is required between the 
breach of the fiduciary duty and the losses alleged.).    
                                                           
0
     In this regard, section 1104(c) operates in alternative 
circumstances, excusing a fiduciary from liability for "any loss" 
or "by reason of any breach" which "results from [a] 
participant's or [a] beneficiary's exercise of control."  29 
U.S.C. § 1104(c). 
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 Section 1104(c)'s text, however, neither defines nor 
clarifies its central element -- the "control" a pension plan may 
permit a participant or a beneficiary to exercise.  29 U.S.C. 
§1104(c).  Accordingly, we look to ERISA's legislative history 
for assistance.  From a House Conference Report, we learn that 
section 1104(c) established a "special rule" for plans which 
allow a participant or a beneficiary "independent control" over 
individual account assets:    
 Certain individual account plans. [A] 
special rule is provided for individual 
account plans where the participant is 
permitted to, and in fact does, exercise 
independent control over the assets in his 
individual account.  In this case, the 
individual is not to be regarded as a 
fiduciary and other persons who are 
fiduciaries with respect to the plan are not 
to be liable for any loss that results from 
the exercise and control by the participant 
or beneficiary.   
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 5085-86. 
          From that same Report, we further learn that Congress 
conceptualized control in terms of authority on the part of a 
participant or a beneficiary to issue investment instructions to 
a fiduciary:     
 
Therefore, if the participant instructs the 
plan trustee to invest the full balance of 
his account in, e.g., a single stock, the 
trustee is not be liable for any loss because 
of a failure to diversify or because the 
investment does not meet the prudent man 
standards.  However, the investment must not 
contradict the terms of the plan, and if the 
plan on its face prohibits such investments, 
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the trustee could not follow the instructions 
and avoid liability. 
 
Id. at 5086. 
          Finally, the Report tells us that a section 1104(c) 
plan must offer a "broad range of investments".  Id.0                     
Before we turn to section 1104(c)'s application to the evidence 
in this case, we have several observations to make.  First, our 
analysis of the statute and Congress' statements of legislative 
intent lead us to believe that while all plans which qualify 
under section 1104(c) have certain elements in common, each 
section 1104(c) plan is unique, depending on the control a plan 
permits participants and beneficiaries to exercise by way of the 
investment instructions they may give.  Second, because section 
1104(c) speaks in terms of a plan which permits control to a 
participant or a beneficiary, a participant's or a beneficiary's 
                                                           
0
 In accordance with Congress' direction that we consult 
the common law of trusts for additional insight into ERISA's 
provisions, we note that a trustee may under certain 
circumstances be discharged from liability for losses that arise 
out of a particular transaction which represents a breach of 
trust.  According to sections 216, 217 and 218 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts respectively, where a beneficiary consents to, 
subsequently affirms or releases a trustee's breach of trust, he 
cannot thereafter hold the trustee liable for losses, unless at 
the time of consent, affirmance or release, the beneficiary was 
incompetent, not informed by the trustee of his rights and the 
material facts, subjected to the trustee's improper influence or 
made party by an interested trustee to an unfair or unreasonable 
bargain.  Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 216, 217, 218 
(1959).  In addition, under section 219 of the Restatement, a 
beneficiary may be barred from holding a trustee liable for 
losses by laches.  Id. § 219.   
  
          We have not found, however, a common law trust 
principle that is analogous to the scheme that Congress 
established in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) as we understand it.    
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control under section 1104(c) stems from a plan's specific 
provisions, not from elements which lie outside the plan's 
structure and which may arguably amount to control in connection 
with a single transaction.  Finally, section 1104(c) is akin to 
an exemption from or a defense to ERISA's general rule, relieving 
fiduciaries in the appropriate circumstances of the liability to 
which they would otherwise be exposed under 29 U.S.C. § 1109.  
Accordingly, a fiduciary which seeks section 1104(c)'s protection 
bears the burden of showing its application. See Lowen v. Tower 
Asset Management, Inc., 829 F. 2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and 
should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an 
exemption under 29 U.S.C. §1108 from 29 U.S.C. §1106(b), ERISA's 
prohibited transactions provision); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F. 
2d 1455, 1467-68 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 
(1984) (ESOP fiduciaries charged with violations of section 
1104(a)'s duty of prudence bear the burden of proving the 
"statutory defense" of adequate consideration under 29 U.S.C. 
§1108(e)).       
          Having carefully reviewed the record with this 
background in mind, we conclude that Unisys is not entitled to 
summary judgment on its section 1104(c) defense.  The record is 
inadequately developed as to critical facts and demonstrates the 
existence of disputed material facts as to whether the Plans fall 
within the statute's coverage.         
 Starting with Congress' mandate that a section 1104(c) 
plan provide "a broad range of investments", we look to see 
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whether the uncontroverted evidence Unisys submitted establishes 
that the Plans gave participants a wide array of investments with 
materially different risk and return characteristics.  Given 
Unisys' theory of control, we also look to see whether the 
evidence establishes that a participant could remove his or her 
assets from, in this instance, the Fixed Income or Insurance 
Contract Funds and place them in a comparable investment vehicle. 
In our view, if the Plans did not offer an acceptable alternative 
to GIC investments, a participant did not have the freedom and, 
in turn, the control to decide how his or her assets were 
ultimately invested.  In this regard, we find the evidence 
lacking.  The record includes documents which give a general 
description of the six funds the Plans offered; it does not, 
however, include evidence sufficient to measure the breadth of 
actual plan investments or assess all of the investment 
alternatives available to participants.   
          As stated, Unisys' contention that the plaintiffs were 
permitted control under section 1104(c) and indeed exercised it 
is premised, in part, on the information Unisys allegedly 
disseminated to participants regarding "his or her investment 
options[,] [his or her] obligation to manage his or her own 
investments[,] the risks associated with th[e] election to invest 
in GICs[,] and developments surrounding Executive Life. . . ." 
(See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to Strike Jury Demand, pp.15-17).  We agree 
that information, both general and relating specifically to 
Executive Life, is an essential element of Unisys' section 
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1104(c) theory that the plaintiffs themselves ultimately 
controlled whether their respective assets were invested in 
Executive Life GICs, even though Unisys chose the investment in 
the first place.  For Unisys to prevail under section 1104(c), 
however, it must establish that the Plans provided information 
sufficient for the average participant to understand and assess: 
the control the Plans permitted a participant to exercise and the 
financial consequences he or she assumed by exercising that 
control; the rights that ERISA provided to participants and the 
obligations that the Act imposed upon fiduciaries; the Plans' 
terms and operating procedures; the alternative funds the Plans 
offered; the investments in which assets in each fund were 
placed; the financial condition and performance of the 
investments; and developments which materially affected the 
financial status of the investments.  
          Based on our careful review of the record, we find that 
Unisys has not satisfied its burden on summary judgment to show 
that this necessary information was provided to the Plans' 
participants.  Significantly, the written documents which 
establish and maintain the Plans are conspicuously missing from 
the record.  Thus, we cannot determine what information the Plans 
made available to participants as a matter of course.  If Unisys' 
dissemination of the information it relies upon to assert section 
1104(c)'s application in this case was not performed pursuant to 
a plan term but was merely situational, an isolated response to a 
crisis in one investment, then the control that Unisys contends 
the plaintiffs had was not permitted by the Plans as section 
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1104(c) requires and the statute's relief would be unavailable. 
As for the disclosures that Unisys included in the record, 
whether they communicated to the average participant the 
information we have decided is critical to Unisys' section 
1104(c) defense are questions of fact properly left to the 
factfinder to decide at trial.    
          Moving to the second component of Unisys' position 
regarding the plaintiffs' control -- the Plans' contribution and 
transfer terms -- we agree with Unisys that the evidence is 
uncontroverted that for all intents and purposes, a participant's 
ability to make initial contributions to the Plans' various 
investment funds was unfettered.  The transfer restrictions that 
the Plans imposed upon participants, however, are problematic. 
The record reveals that the Plans restricted transfers which 
involved all of the GIC Funds and the Short-Term Investment Fund 
in order to obtain higher interest rates from GIC issuers.0 While 
we have no quarrel with the reason for the transfer restrictions 
or with the notion that the frequency with which a participant 
issues investment instructions may be restricted without 
necessarily eliminating the control that section 1104(c) 
contemplates, we believe that a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the duration and pervasiveness of the restrictions 
imposed upon participants by the Plans so significantly limited 
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     Charles Service, a member of Unisys Corporation's Capital 
Management Trust Investment Department explained:  "These 
restrictions allow the insurance companies to forecast their cash 
flows with greater certainty, thereby reducing their risk.  With 
their risk reduced, the insurance companies which bid for our 
GICs can offer significantly higher yields." 
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their ability to decide in which Funds their respective assets 
were allocated, that the restrictions are antithetical to the 
concept of "independent control" that Congress enacted in section 
1104(c).  Moreover, assuming that control existed at the Plans' 
inception, the factfinder could conclude that when Unisys agreed 
on October 17, 1990, to give Executive Life the right under 
certain circumstances "to not honor employee requests for 
withdrawal" in exchange for Executive Life's consent to a 
reduction in the waiting period for asset transfers between "non-
competing" funds and the GIC Funds, control within the meaning of 
section 1104(c) was no longer available to the participants under 
the Plans from that point forward.         
 Thus, we conclude that Unisys is not entitled to 
summary judgment on its section 1104(c) defense to the 
plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
 Finally, we observe that in the event the plaintiffs 
prove that Unisys breached section 1104(a)'s duty of prudence 
and/or duty of diversification and Unisys proves that section 
1104(c) applies as a defense, the losses for which Unisys would 
not be liable are those which, as to each plaintiff, occurred 
after he or she, free under the Plans' transfer terms to place 
the assets in any of the Plans' investment vehicles, exercised 
control by making the informed decision to contribute to and/or 
maintain assets in the Fixed Income Fund or the Insurance 
Contract Fund.  
 
V. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's order of January 25, 1995 granting summary judgment to 
the defendants on Count I of the second amended consolidated 
class action complaint and remand for further proceedings on the 
plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary claims under section 1104(a) of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 
§1001 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1995). 
